INTRODUCTION

Can we transcend our own ideological and/or utopian biases to scientifically understand and change our social realities? The question Karl Mannheim posed for social science in his *Ideology and Utopia* (1936) still remains a contested terrain amongst social scientists and cultural relativists alike (e.g., Bordo 1987; Foucault 1972; Harding 1991; Laslett 1990; Longino 1990; Kurzman 1992; Nelson 1993; Wallerstein 1991, 1999). A by-product of this intellectual impasse has been a revival of interest in Mannheim’s original formulations of the problem and ways of resolving it (e.g., Kettler and Meja 1995; Kuklick 1983; McCarthy 1996; Pilcher 1994; Turner 1995).

Undoubtedly, there is much in Mannheim that is valuable. Kettler and Meja (above) are justified in inviting us to critically revisit and reconstruct Mannheim’s unfinished project. The words critical and unfinished in their call must be underlined, however, for otherwise the dialectics of revisiting Mannheim may reproduce his shortcomings as well as his achievements. We may still continue to practice a sociology of knowledge which does not treat knowledge as a part of social existence as a whole. We may still continue to practice the “social origins of knowledge” discourse in our sociologies. We may still continue to treat the self not as what it is: a social relation. We may still remain reluctant to extend the reality of “social existence,” and knowledges of it, to the intrapersonal and world-historical domains.

This article revisits the conceptual framework employed by Karl Mannheim in his *Ideology and Utopia* (1936), seeking (1) a new appraisal of the self-defeating arguments which influenced later developments in the scholarly field of sociology of knowledge, and (2) new avenues to address the vital issues originally raised by him. After a brief overview of the history of

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1. An earlier version of this article was presented to the “History of Sociology” Refereed Roundtable Session at the 94th Annual Meeting of the American Sociological Association, August 6-10, 1999, Chicago. I thank Judith Stacey, Patricia Lengermann, and Jill Nieburgge-Brantley for their encouragements. Participants in a graduate seminar at the sociology department at Binghamton University (SUNY) provided critical and useful feedback. J.I. “Hans” Bakker (University of Guelph, Canada) and Kevin Fox Gotham (Tulane University) provided useful comments on an earlier draft.
sociology of knowledge and the place of Mannheim in its development, his book *Ideology and Utopia* will be used as an empirical site of conceptual exploration in order to shed new lights on the theoretical and methodological roots of Mannheim’s arguments in his work, and to search for alternative avenues to address the vital question he raised.

**The Sociology of Knowledge and Karl Mannheim**

In broad outlines, the sociology of knowledge has been concerned with the study of the relationship between society and knowledge. However, throughout the history of the subdiscipline the particular views and approaches of individual scholars regarding various methodological, theoretical, and historical issues seem to have often overshadowed their broader definitions of the field. For this reason, the history of the sociology of knowledge has aptly been characterized as the history of its conflicting definitions (Berger & Luckmann 4).

The sociologists of knowledge may be historically classified into seven categories, depending upon the nature of their contribution to the field’s development: 1-*Precursors*, those in the distant past from whose texts indirect concerns with the subject matter of sociology of knowledge may be found; 2-*Originators*, those in the past in whose texts a conscious, explicit, and direct concern with the subject matter of the sociology of knowledge was evident; 3-*Founder*, the scholar who formally and systematically developed the “classical” definitional and conceptual frameworks of the sociology of knowledge as a subdiscipline; 4-*Debaters*, those who became immediately or soon engaged in arguing for or against the value of the new formalized subdiscipline; 5-*Diffusers*, those who, going beyond intellectual debates about the need for the new subdiscipline, actually began to carry out concrete research in the new field; 6-*Talkers of the Prose*, those who have been or are carrying out research within or relevant to the sociology of knowledge without necessarily acknowledging the connection of their work with the subject matter of this so-called “marginalized” discipline; and 7-*Revivers*, those who have, in recent years, considered it vital to revive the explicit concerns of the subdiscipline, though in the context of contemporary intellectual and scholarly interests.

What strikes a reader of texts produced by these scholars over time are the many different ways in which the complexity of the interaction of social existence and consciousness have been tackled, and sometimes reduced, by focusing on one or another aspect of the total dialectical process. However, a survey of the historical development of the sociology of knowledge also clearly demonstrates how this field of social scientific inquiry has never been “marginalized,” but has in fact grown in importance, though in the deceptive clothings of changing research field names, interests, and titles introduced by different sociologists of knowledge. The specific approaches of particular sociologies of knowledge may have turned in time to be transitory and limited in content; however, as a scholarly discipline, the sociology of knowledge continues to be an important and growing area of scholarship. This fact becomes even more clear when we realize that the essential concern with the relationship between knowledge and society was as much a central concern for the Mannheimian paradigm as it is for the contemporary debates in the so-called cultural studies, discourses on postmodernism and poststructuralism, or studies on coloniality.

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1. Given the particular focus of this study on Mannheim, a survey of scholarship in the sociology of knowledge based on the proposed classificatory scheme will not be presented here. For an effort towards that end, see Tamdgidi (forthcoming).
and post-coloniality.

There is a strange and peculiar irony in the historical unfolding of the sociology of knowledge, however. While Mannheim sought to transcend the relativism of ideological and utopian mental structures in search of a “relational” science of politics, believing in the possibility of revising science’s epistemological foundations to achieve that purpose, he was sometimes viciously attacked and criticized (e.g., Popper 1963) for having in fact embraced “relativism” himself and undermined the possibility of “science,” including his own sought after science of politics. Today, however, when contemporary scholarship has discovered “relativism” to be the rule, and science and search for universals have been relegated by some postmodernists to the dustbin of “modernity,” the revivers of the Mannheimian sociology of knowledge praise Mannheim for his “relativism,” a tendency for which his older critiques accused him, and, by the way, a tendency he himself denied in his work (85).

The unfolding of this historical irony, however, indicates that the dialectic of the negation of Mannheimian sociology of knowledge is by no means over. Is it possible to revisit the original questions Mannheim raised in his sociology of knowledge and discover what led to the future emergence of a postmodernist paradigm which, by denying the possibility or value of science, stands today in the very opposite of where Mannheim stood almost seventy years ago? Is it possible to find a mode of research which addresses not only the goals and dilemmas of the classical sociology of knowledge, but also the important issues and dilemmas raised in the contemporary scholarship?

Although the origins of the sociology of knowledge may be traced to various nineteenth century sources, and its philosophical problems received considerable attention in the early twentieth century from Mannheim’s contemporary, Max Scheler, who coined its name, it was in Mannheim’s works that the scientific study of “social origins of knowledge” found an explicit and systematic sociological treatment. It is no wonder that subsequent works in the field have predominantly involved arguments with and/or commentaries on Mannheim—and not Scheler.\(^1\)

Mannheim’s works, especially his *Ideology and Utopia*, have often been treated as marking a turning point in the unfolding of scholarship in the field.\(^2\) As recently as in 1995, it was suggested that “It is still impossible to think critically about the sociology of knowledge without reflecting on *Ideology and Utopia*” (Kettler and Meja 3). It has also been observed that “It is safe to say when sociologists today think of the sociology of knowledge, pro or con, they usually do so in terms of Mannheim’s formulation of it” (Berger & Luckmann 9). It is therefore impossible to critically study and evaluate the historical development and prospects of the scholarly subdiscipline of sociology of knowledge as it stands today without paying central attention to Mannheim’s contributions to and receptions by the scholarship in the field.

For Mannheim, the sociology of knowl-

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1. Bryan Turner has suggested that “Mannheim’s text [*Ideology and Utopia*] proved sufficiently influential to earn him the, probably unwarranted, title of ‘the founder of the sociology’ as a new and separate field of sociological inquiry” (Turner 718-727). Although Turner does not further explain in the same article in what sense he considers Mannheim’s status as the “founder” of the sociology of knowledge “unwarranted,” he seems to recognize the significance of Mannheim’s work not only for sociology and political science, but also as “clearly central to many problems in conventional debates about epistemology in both the natural and the social sciences” (718).

2. Note for example this observation by editors of a reader in the sociology of knowledge: “Although our principal concern here is with developments in the sociology of knowledge after the translation of Mannheim’s *Ideology and Utopia* was published in 1936, it should be recognized that the roots of this perspective go much further back in history” (Curtis & Petras 3).
edge was concerned with the scientific study of the “social origins of knowledge” so that our knowledge of and in politics may become less ideological or utopian and more “scientific” as a means for diagnosing the ills of present society and for planning and building a just society. Mannheim distinguished the “particular” conception of ideology, involving the adversary’s individually articulated thoughts, beliefs, and deceptions, from the “total” conception of ideology, involving the overall socially conditioned structure of the adversary’s world-view, both of which were then distinguished as “special” conceptions of ideology from the “general” conception of ideology, involving the recognition by observers that even their own—and not just the adversary’s—knowledge is ideological and thus socially rooted. Mannheim’s sociology of knowledge dealt with the “total” and “general” conceptions of ideology, leaving the “particular” conception to other studies of ideology.

Mannheim then proceeded to construct typologies of historical forms of ideological (bureaucratic conservative, conservative historicist, liberal-democratic bourgeois, socialist-communist, and fascist) and utopian (Chiliastic, liberal-humanitarian, conservative, and socialist-communist) collective mental structures. The problem for Mannheim, who was seeking a scientific approach to politics free of such one-sided biases, was how to synthesize the partial truths embedded in each of these political “perspectives” on social reality when he had already emphasized that even the observer’s own knowledge is socially grounded. He suggested that the way out of this impasse is through the agency of the modern “unattached intellectuals” trained in the new discipline of sociology of knowledge—who were then encouraged by Mannheim, by the example of his own efforts in his book, to scientifically and critically synthesize and transcend various partial ideologies and utopias, and keep alive the hope and the efforts for a scientific approach to social knowledge and change.

The ultimate goal of Mannheim’s sociology of knowledge as introduced in Ideology and Utopia was to contribute to the development of a social science (especially of politics) that helps overcome the ideological and/or utopian distortions in our thinking. One way to evaluate Mannheim’s contribution is to investigate whether and how his “sociology of knowledge” helped him transcend his own potential biases in Ideology and Utopia. In other words, as a potential (or actual) member of the “unattached intelligentsia” upon whom he laid great hopes in rescuing socio-political knowledge from ideological and/or utopian distortions, was Mannheim himself aware of, and did he succeed in transcending, any such biases in his own arguments throughout the book?

IDEOLOGY AND UTOPIA IN IDEOLOGY AND UTOPIA

Given the centrality of the “social origins of knowledge” thesis in Mannheim’s conception of the sociology of knowledge, it is logical to begin our exploration by asking how Mannheim traced his own intellectual genealogy in the historical panorama of the scholarship preceding him. How did Mannheim situate the “origins” of his own thought in the (pre-)history of the scholarly field he intended to build?

“Social Determination of Knowledge” as Ideology

A puzzling aspect of Mannheim’s thought, which at the same time constituted the core of his argument in the book, was his taken-for-granted “social determination of knowledge” thesis. At this stage of argument, the purpose is not to question the validity of this thesis itself. Our question is:
how had Mannheim determined that "social determination of thought" (or "social origins of thought") is the fundamental thesis of the sociology of knowledge as introduced in his book?

For Mannheim the thesis of social determination of thought did not seem to be a matter for dispute, to be tested and proven in the course of scientific research process; it was a taken-for-granted truth already discovered, only to be demonstrated historically and further developed in the epistemological domain. He not only insisted on, or rather took for granted, the truth of his thesis, he even used it in order to explain and demonstrate the historical origins of his "sociology of knowledge" itself—more specifically of his own thoughts regarding the emergence of the "general" conception of ideology, and thus the socio-historical basis of his own approach to the sociology of knowledge.

Such an assumption on Mannheim's part is puzzling and ironic when it is considered in the historical context of "social existence," often to his own acknowledgment (though very briefly reviewed at the concluding section of his book), of other competing scholarly approaches to the relationship of thought and society as adopted by many of his predecessors or contemporaries. The "historical materialist" approach to the relationship between thought and society, upon which Mannheim generally based his whole argument, was only one among several competing approaches to what later became canonized by him under the rubric "sociology of knowledge." Certainly, the idealist approach of Dilthey, to which Mannheim himself referred using the label "pragmatist," was known to Mannheim when writing his book. So were the "psychological" approaches of Nietzsche, the "co-determinist" approach of Scheler, and the Weberian approach of tracing the origins of capitalism to the Protestant ethic. These remotely equalled the strictly materialist approach to which Mannheim traced the origins of the sociology of knowledge in the brief historical sketch at the end of his book.

The question here is not why Mannheim preferred the materialist approach to the sociology of knowledge vis-à-vis other approaches. In other words, to be faithful to his argument in the book, being scientific does not necessarily mean one cannot be "evaluative" in one's thinking and take sides on matters of research or socio-political thinking. In Mannheim's view the problem arises when one is not aware of one's biases, of the social rootedness of one's own thinking. Mannheim's approach to building the new discipline revolving around the fundamental thesis of the "determination of thought by society" was hardly a result of explicated demonstration on the part of Mannheim of an awareness of the one-sidedness of his thesis, hardly a result of argumentation against other competing viewpoints and approaches in order to demonstrate the advantage of his own "materialist" approach. It is for this reason that in the course of development of his argument in the book, we never encounter an effort on his part to actually synthesize various existing approaches to the relationship of thought and society comparable to the effort he exerted in analyzing and synthesizing various ideological and utopian mental structures.

In constructing his typology of ideological and utopian mentalities, Mannheim in fact used the very taken-for-granted thesis of his sociology of knowledge to construct his ideal types. In other words, it is the social positioning of various Chiliastic, conservative, bourgeois-liberal, Marxist, or Fascist political forces in society that determines their ideological and/or utopian approaches and thinking styles in social life. The very thesis of "social determination of

1.Dilthey has been characterized as "probably the key figure in the 'idealistic' tradition in modern social thought" (Bullock and Woodings 182).
knowledge” was not under question, but was taken for granted as the truth with which Mannheim constructed his ideal types and against which he judged various social trends on the political scene. Such avoidance of competing perspectives on the relationship of thought and society (other than the Marxist approach) certainly did not fulfill the requirement of the standard Mannheim himself set for the “unattached intellectuals” regarding the need to synthesize various perspectives on issues at stake.

To make matters worse, Mannheim in fact tended to move away from the efforts needed for a synthesis of perspectives on the relationship of thought and society. For instance, having identified the epistemological and psychological approaches to the study of ideology in the first chapter, he decided that the “particular” conception of ideology did not fall within the scope of what he considered to be the subject matter of his sociology of knowledge. Consequently he banished the analysis of ideological mentality at the particular level of individual thought patterns as being irrelevant to his “sociological” approach to the problem. Was Mannheim’s own academic position as a “sociologist” an invisible cause of his lack of interest in the study of the “particular” conception of ideology? This seems to be a plausible, though probably partial, explanation of why Mannheim seemed eager to restrict his “sociology of knowledge” to the field in whose development and occupation he himself had an obviously vested interest. Instead of making efforts to critically synthesize various epistemological and psychological approaches to the theory of knowledge with his own “sociological” approach, in other words, Mannheim opted to dismiss them, or at best allow them only so far as they served the purpose of further substantiating the truthfulness of his own thinking. This once again seems to be far from the requirement of intellectual synthesis which Mannheim expected “unattached intellectuals” to perform in the modern academic life.

Mannheim’s insistence on the thesis of “social determination of thought” as the fundamental premise of the sociology of knowledge indicates an ideological bias in his thinking. It is so not because Mannheim was consciously taking sides in his argument but the opposite, because he seemed to be unaware of such one-sidedness in his own thinking. He simply took the thesis for granted as an uncontroversial, universally accepted, “absolute truth.”

**Science or Utopia?**

Another puzzling aspect of Mannheim’s argument in the book is his double-standard in treating the utopian distortions of thought.

On one hand, Mannheim equated utopian mentality on par with the ideological distortions of reality, suggesting that “the quest to transcend the ideological and utopian biases in thinking is the quest for reality” (1936:98). He of course had generally set aside from the subject matter of his analysis in the book what he called the “absolute utopian” mentalities which are transhistorical and do not aim at realization in concrete reality. Therefore, such utopian mentalities could not have been those sources of mental distortions which Mannheim was particularly interested in eradicating. He was interested in the “relative utopian” thoughts which have historically aimed at shattering existing reality. These constituted the subject matter of his book so far as the utopian distortions of thought were concerned—and he constructed an historical typology of such utopian mentalities when he analyzed the Chiliastic, conservative, liberal-bourgeois, and Marxist varieties of utopian thought.

But, on the other hand, Mannheim himself concluded his book (part V, section 4) with a particularly explicit appeal to the
reader, and to the “unattached intellectuals,” to keep the utopian thought alive and active, lamenting the end of utopias in the contemporary socio-historical situation when most of the previously oppositional forces with utopian aspirations have gained political ascendancy in social life. A detailed and careful reading of Mannheim’s text does not provide an adequate explanation as to why he applied in his quest for a “science of politics” such a double-standard when it came to the utopian distortions of thought. Even the organization of his book seems to reinforce the sense of puzzlement in the mind of the reader regarding his double-standard. For example, the second chapter of the book is titled “Ideology and Utopia,” however, other than few references in the first few paragraphs of the first section, there is hardly any discussion about “utopian” mentality in this chapter of the book. What reference Mannheim did make to utopianism in this part of the book essentially conveys to the reader the meaning that ideology and utopia both involve distortions of reality, and that their transcendence is equally necessary in any successful quest for a “science of politics.” But the discussion on the utopian mentality was postponed only after the third chapter of the book in which Mannheim developed his notion of “optimal dynamic relational” method as opposed to the traditional notion of “objectivity” in science in order to build the foundations of a science of politics. In other words, such a discussion was rendered prior to and independent of his analysis of utopian mentality in the following chapter of the book which was specifically devoted to the analysis of varieties of utopian thought. This conveys to the reader the sense that perhaps Mannheim did not mean after all to equate the utopian mentality as a form of ideological distortion. Mannheim’s handling of the utopian mentality as part of his total project of establishing the sociology of knowledge as a new discipline was at best a result of carelessness, and at worst due to bias. And this utopian bias, as in the case of his ideological bias, was left unexplained and unexplained, and seems to have been unconscious. Mannheim seemed to be simply unaware of these biases in his thinking while developing his argument.

The above ideological and utopian unconscious biases in Mannheim’s thinking can hardly be dismissed as being irrelevant to his main argument in the book. They constituted the core, the very essence and foundation of his efforts at building a new field of scientific inquiry. As reflected in the very title of his book, and in his own text, the quest for transcendence of ideological and utopian biases through increased awareness of social rootedness of knowledge constitutes the very essence of the quest for a science of politics, the quest for reality. One may even use Mannheim’s own theory of the distinction between ideology (as expressing the mentality of those in dominant positions in society) and utopian mentality (as expressing the interests of the dominated strata) to shed some light on Mannheim’s own diverging ideological and utopian biases in his argument in the book. One aimed at the establishment of his own school of thought within the academic circles, the other was directed at the outside dominant social powers against whom Mannheim’s “unattached intellectuals” had to wage intellectual and/or political battles.

**Eurocentricity, and other Biases**

Other than his ideological and utopian biases indicated above, Mannheim’s text involved other subtler forms of bias as well.
One was directed towards religion—mysticism in particular. For instance, he included a strongly worded section in his text against what he considered to be the mystical attitude to social life (part II, section 8). When he did take a religious mystical movement to explore (Chiliasm, for instance) it was not because of any inherent value in the content of the doctrine inspiring the movement, but because of how this particular movement departed from traditional religion, displaying an historical illustration for his social analysis. While he found traditional western science problematic in terms of its “objectivist” biases, and thereby searched for a “relational” method that would take into consideration the influence of the subject on the cognitive process, Mannheim still projected his efforts as a quest for science. However, his notion of science seemed to be too monolithic to include any contributions from non-western or “non-scientific” literature and scholarship.

This points to another related bias in Mannheim’s text which is that for him the “world” was the west. What took place outside the west was not worthy of his efforts at development of a “science of politics.” The social existence for Mannheim, in other words, was that found in the west, and not constituted globally. He did not see a need for developing a “synthesis” of scientific and religious viewpoints across western and non-western traditions, since for him the latter was the very force that opposed the emergence of the former.

The problem is not that Mannheim had his own positions with regards to religion, the spatiotemporal coordinates of his social analysis, the professional “sociological” implications of his research work, the materialist bent on his thinking, or the utopian aspirations of his career, etc. If there was one thing that Mannheim made clear in his book, it was that scientific study and evaluative thinking are not mutually incompatible as the traditional objectivist science would make us believe, but that it is possible and perhaps inevitable that our own biases, and the social rootedness of our own thinking, will influence the process and results of scientific investigation. What was problematic in Mannheim’s efforts in the book was that contrary to his own insistence that only through conscious awareness of the social rootedness of one’s thinking one can transcend its distortive ideological and utopian influences on one’s thought, he left behind many of the most central and fundamental aspects of his own argument in the book in the shadow of unconscious awareness.

Of course, Mannheim did make some efforts to catch his own ideological/utopian biases in his work; in fact, he caught and attempted to transcend one when dealing with the transition from the “non-evaluative” to the “evaluative” conceptions of ideology. But his attempt seemed to become merely a staging ground for furtherance of his argument than a genuine acknowledgment of the degree of seriousness of his own potential faults; he simply relegated the matter to a long footnote where he acknowledged but immediately dismissed the possibility of serious implications emanating from distortions in his own thought (Mannheim 88). In the very attempt Mannheim made to move beyond ideologies and utopias to arrive at a sociology of knowledge, he displayed unconscious ideological and utopian biases.

Mannheim’s attempt in Ideology and Utopia did not seem to be itself an historically “unattached” attempt at building a new scientific discipline. His sociology of knowledge was attached. It was an historically specific formulation by a member of an historically and geographically grounded western, secular, materialist, academic,
intellectual, and sociological movement. Mannheim seemed to be unaware of such unconscious biases and social groundedness of his own thinking.

But even if he had such unconscious biases, Mannheim may have argued that they did not necessarily contradict his argument. He may have stressed that these biases should not be traced to his social position, because his objectively “unattached” intellectual position would eventually neutralize his tendency to have such unconscious biases. To give Mannheim the benefit of a doubt, let us say that he may have argued that such biases are to be expected in his new discipline in formation. He himself acknowledged after all (Mannheim 88-90) that at the very time one is revealing some biases, one may unconsciously be committing new ones. Such biases, he may have argued, should be traced to the subconscious mind (or the “collective unconscious” mind as Mannheim referred to it), left over from the scholar’s pre-intellectual conditions of life, biases which can be eradicated through self-conscious efforts and intellectual research and debate among the “unattached” intellectuals.

Mannheim may have argued, in other words, that the problem was simply a matter of insufficient application and execution of an otherwise sound theoretical framework that he had built. For this reason, it is important to examine the theoretical core of Mannheim’s argument.

**Theoretical Roots**

Many scholars who have taken issues with Mannheim’s theoretical scheme in *Ideology and Utopia* regarding the problem of relativism vs. relationality of knowledge on one hand, and the issue of “unattached intellectuals” on the other hand, have nevertheless taken for granted the “social origin of knowledge” as the theoretical thesis which Mannheim had raised to the status of a fundamental premise of his sociology of knowledge. The three issues seem to be inter-related, however, since both the problem of relativism vs. relationality and the problem of “unattached intellectuals” emanate from the application of the “social determination of knowledge” thesis. Let us explore more the inter-relatedness of these three issues.

Mannheim’s attempt at distinguishing “relationality” from “relativism” was an effort on his part to argue that a sociology of knowledge built upon the theoretical premise of social determination of knowledge does not necessarily imply that truth is not attainable in scientific research. His relational method merely insisted that all knowledge, especially that held by the investigator herself or himself, is socially rooted. The sociology of knowledge, according to Mannheim, does not say anything about, and is not concerned with the truthfulness of, that knowledge as such. In fact, Mannheim explicitly stated that the investigation of social rootedness of knowledge does not necessarily have to involve an investigation of the truthfulness of the knowledge under investigation. The study of social origins of religious thinking, he argued for example, does not have to rely upon the investigation of truth in the claims made regarding the existence of god(s).

However, by suggesting that social rootedness of knowledge is in fact the basis of ideological and/or utopian distortions of reality, Mannheim’s insistence on relationalism inevitably implied a relativistic attitude towards scientific investigation. The whole purpose of Mannheim’s search in the book seeking a “science of politics,” after all, was to find a way of transcending the distortive influences of social position and interest on the social scientific investigation (of knowledge and politics). It was here that Mannheim found it necessary to borrow from Alfred Weber the notion of the “unattached intelligentsia,” which provid-
ed Mannheim with a way of transcending the contradiction which was created when the “social determination of knowledge” thesis was raised to the status of a theoretical premise for the sociology of knowledge as a whole—for without the “unattached intellectuals” Mannheim’s sociology of knowledge would be a recipe for failure and an admission of futility of social (if not all) science, including his sociology of knowledge.

Issues of “relativism vs. relationality” on one hand and “unattached intellectuals” on the other hand, therefore, were both intricately bound up with Mannheim’s employment of “social determination of knowledge” as the fundamental thesis of his sociology of knowledge. In order to critically evaluate the theoretical core of Mannheim’ argument in the book, we need to further explore the innerconnections of these three aspects of Mannheim’s conceptual framework.

Throughout the book, there was a continuing tension between Mannheim’s adoption of the theory of “social determination of knowledge” as the central thesis of his sociology of knowledge on one hand, and his efforts to develop a “science of politics” on the other hand. Mannheim suggested that through increasing awareness of the relational nature of our thought, of the social rootedness of our thinking, and of how our knowledge is socially determined, we can gradually gain mastery and control over such determination. This is the way Mannheim tried to reconcile the necessary implications of his central thesis with the possibility of a “science of politics.” Of course, for Mannheim, it was the “detached intellectual” who could best achieve such an awareness and control over the social determinateness of thought; her or his social existence allowed such a possibility to be realized.

Let us assume that Mannheim’s exclusive consideration of the modern “detached intellectuals” as being the only social strata capable of transcendence of social determination of knowledge is correct. Also let us assume that Mannheim’s “social origin of knowledge” thesis is a universally valid truth applicable to all human beings. Let us also assume that Mannheim’s insistence on relationality of knowledge does not mean that knowledge is always relative and that truth is unattainable, and does not preclude the possibility of attainment of truth on the part of human beings, despite the fact that their knowledge is socially conditioned and rooted. In other words, let us assume that all the three elements of Mannheim’s conceptual framework is valid.

Now, the central purpose of Mannheim’s sociology of knowledge was to transcend the socially rooted ideological and/or utopian distortions in thought so that a “true” science of politics may be attained. For Mannheim, a fundamental requirement of such transcendence was the increasingly conscious awareness by (primarily) the “unattached intellectuals” of the social rootedness of the “collective unconscious” biases inherent in their knowledge. Mannheim argued that through such awareness it is in fact possible to become free of such determinations, and reverse the process of social determinations of our thinking, thereby creating new social conditions (of a “planned society” perhaps) in which human beings can consciously determine the course of evolution of their social existence. Let us assume, again, that Mannheim’s projection of the utility of his sociology of knowledge is correct, and in fact more and more human beings (primarily, or initially at least, “detached intellectuals”) become aware of the blind forces determining their thought and thereby from being the slaves of social determination become the masters of social circumstances. In other words, increasingly we have a society in which thought determines social existence (through social praxis), rather than the opposite—thanks to Man-
nheim’s sociology of knowledge. However, to the degree the ultimate purpose of Mannheim’s sociology of knowledge is realized, to the same degree the central thesis of his doctrine is undermined, for increasingly society is constituted consciously of and by people who are not slaves to the social circumstances but are its social planners and architects. At the very least, we have a mixed hybrid form of social reality in which social existence determines and is determined by human conscious praxis. The success of Mannheim’s sociology of knowledge, in other words, undermines the very “social origin of knowledge” thesis built as a universal law into the theoretical core of his sociology of knowledge. Mannheim’s sociology of knowledge thus proves to be, as it is constructed by him in *Ideology and Utopia*, a self-defeating enterprise.

Besides, one thing that is not clear is how Mannheim’s argument regarding the “detached intellectuals” could lead to bringing about a more democratic and “free” society. No matter how liberated these intellectuals become, they still live in the midst of a society in which the division of labor deprives many of specialized intellectual activity. In order to avoid the ideologization or utopianization of their thinking, therefore, such intellectuals would need to remain organizationally independent of the rest of social strata since otherwise this would begin to “attach” their organization to socially determined forces. In other words, all other “subconscious” biases aside, one bias would be endemic and ever present to such organizations of “unattached” intellectuals, the bias towards non-intellectuals—towards the so-called (by Mannheim) “simple man on the street.”

Mannheim would have perhaps disagreed, arguing that intellectuals’ knowledge can in fact be able to transcend such biases as may originate from intellectuals’ specific social position vs. non-intellectuals. But, one may also counterpoise the argument that the scientific knowledge produced by “unattached” intellectuals cannot remain so when transmitted to non-intellectuals—using Mannheim’s own argument. In other words, the scientific products of Mannheim’s sociology of knowledge are bound to become socially determined (i.e., ideological and/or utopian) as soon as their ideas or trained cadres leave the new academia to enter the “attached” world. Either all human beings can and should then become intellectuals in order to preserve the scientific nature of knowledge thus transmitted—in which case the universal law of social existence determining consciousness would be inoperative and null due to the application of an exceptional rule to all, thus defeating Mannheim’s argument, or that such science will have to remain the exclusive property of intellectuals; only they would be fit to develop and implement science.

But this means intellectuals would have to both intellectualize and to perform all other social functions for the rest of humanity all by themselves—which then, of course, would end their intellectual careers. The middle way, that of maintaining a permanent intellectual vs. non-intellectual social division of labor, two sizable divided camps, one ruling over the other, moreover, would hardly be possible by purely “intellectual” means. This would, according to Mannheim’s own logic, lead to the unscientific reproduction of utopian (today: if intellectuals are in opposition) and/or ideological (tomorrow: if intellectuals are in power) mentalities—and render the new discipline of sociology of knowledge, as formed by Mannheim, at best self-defeating, and at worst scientifically and democratically regressive.

This reveals the limited nature of applicability of Mannheim’s theoretical thesis of “social determination of knowledge” for it is only a theory of a special case, of the state of society in which individuals, especially
the “detached intellectuals,” have not yet become consciously aware of and have not yet developed mastery over the social circumstances which shape their thoughts and actions. Mannheim’s proposed theoretical thesis of “social determination of thought,” presumably traceable to Marx, can therefore hardly sustain the claimed liberating implications of his own intellectual efforts.

Partially perhaps, but Mannheim’s theoretical inconsistency should not be totally blamed on Marx, however. Mannheim’s entire argument in *Ideology and Utopia* was presumably based on the proposed model of determinism—borrowed from Marx—regarding social existence determining human consciousness. But Mannheim borrowed from Marx only half-way; and that is where his inconsistency began. Marx had been more consistent in his theory of “social determination of consciousness” and his views on the relationality of knowledge and on who in society was subject to such a “universal law.” Marx had not recognized the existence of “unattached” intellectuals—the determinism applied to all individuals and social groups; the scienticity, and truthfulness, of social groups’ knowledge were determined by the degree to which they arose from or aligned themselves with the revolutionary productive forces and classes of an historical era. This was a more consistent, though not for other reasons flawless, theoretical formulation. Mannheim wanted on one hand to remain a “materialist” (i.e., social existence determining consciousness, etc.) but to find a justification, or legitimation, for the scienticity of his intellectual project apart from (especially Marxist) “political parties,” parties who in Mannheim’s judgment seemed to be failing in their missions, and were producing only “ideologies” or “utopias,” not “science.” So entered the theory of “exceptional” position of intellectuals into his argument. It is true that Marx did believe certain individuals or groups, including but not only intellectuals (i.e., in the case of “Bonapartism”), may subjectively rise above their class and social interests. But he immediately explained such exceptions by means of revealing the operation (or more correctly the misoperation) of the general rule (class struggle) within historically concrete conditions due to concrete balance and dynamics of class forces. Mannheim’s theory of exceptional position of intellectuals, however, disproved the rule, since the exception and the rule were expected to be operative for the same phenomena at the same time and place: i.e., a social group whose consciousness is and is not determined by its social origin. The fundamental mistake Mannheim made when he borrowed the theory of “detached intellectuals” was that he applied a double-standard to the meaning of this “detachment.” The fact that the intellectuals are detached from classes, which are socio-economically grounded social strata, does not necessarily mean that they are detached from status and general division of labor stratifications in social organization—divisions which obviously implicate and influence the social interests (including economic ones) of intellectuals as a distinct social strata.

Mannheim’s attempt to build a new discipline based on his own unconscious misrepresentations of Marx, not only once again proves the degree to which the fundamental thesis of the sociology of knowledge was itself historically grounded, but also, and more importantly, it demonstrates how biographically grounded and subjective social scientific activity itself can be. A scholar’s particular perspectives could have implications for the works carried out by several generations of scholars. The distinction between the individual and the “collective” unconscious, in other words, is much more important and consequential than the degree to which Mannheim was willing to admit it.

In order to illustrate the theoretical bias
inherent in Mannheim’s sociology of knowledge consider the social existence and knowledge as two nodes of a relationship that is dialectically interlinked through human praxis (see Figure I at the end of this article). The knowledge domain itself may be subdivided into conscious and unconscious domains. Human praxis could operate at two conscious and unconscious loop cycles. The problem is how human praxis can fall increasingly on the conscious loop, rather than being blindly operative along the unconscious loop. Mannheim’s biased thesis leads him to emphasize social existence as the determining node in the whole process, whereas one may argue that at various stages of development of the relationship one or another node may become the determining factor. Blindly operating, the unconscious and habituated structures of social existence determine the process, but once consciousness is gained of the dynamics of the process, the conscious awareness may then be regarded as the determining node in the process. Moreover, it would be wrong to lose sight of the centrality and the determining role of human practice in both the blind and conscious cycles of operation of the dialectic. It is therefore possible to develop a theoretical model for the sociology of knowledge which is dialectical, and non-reductive, a thesis that takes into account the rational side of arguments of various scholars in the field. This would have been a much more fruitful and integrative avenue for the sociology of knowledge to pursue, than relying on Mannheim’s reductive “social determination of knowledge” thesis. In fact, Mannheim’s own goal of integrating various positions would have been much more fruitfully served through this kind of approach, rather than how he actually conducted the building of his own argument in Ideology and Utopia.

The key point to observe in the diagram is the conception of the relationship between mind (conscious or unconscious) and social existence in terms of the relationship between part and whole. If mind is treated as a part of social existence, the question of “social origins of knowledge” would be rendered mute and nonsensical, for it would be recognized that knowledge, conscious or not, is in fact a part and parcel of social existence and not dualistically posed as being apart from it. If knowledge is treated as a part of social existence, then it is itself one of the factors that can determine historical transformation.

The intention here is not to replace Mannheim’s deterministic or reductivist thesis with another deterministic or reductivist thesis centering on the role of human mind or practice in social life. At this point in analysis the purpose is not to offer an alternative thesis for the sociology of knowledge. The purpose is simply to indicate, while hinting at other possible alternative theoretical routes, that Mannheim’s theoretical thesis lacked the necessary degree of breadth and inclusiveness that his own prescriptions for the sociology of knowledge implied for others. The point is to demonstrate the one-sidedness built into the very theoretical thesis of Mannheim’s sociology of knowledge, a bias which inevitably led to the invention of quasi-solutions such as the “unattached intellectuals” or to unnecessary complications arising from the relativism inherent in the “social determination of knowledge” thesis.

Here it is important to examine the methodological grounds on which such a theoretical problem on the part of Mannheim could arise in the first place.

**Methodological Grounds**

The ideological and utopian biases and theoretical inconsistencies in Mannheim’s own thinking as explicated above are too fundamental to be dismissed off-hand as inevitable by-products of intellectualizing. What epistemological elements in Man-
nheim's conceptual framework prevented him from becoming aware of such biases while constructing the very intellectual discipline which aimed at making us scientifically aware of our socially rooted distortions in thought?

In the one case in which Mannheim caught (and dismissed in a footnote) his own bias regarding the transition from non-evaluative to evaluative thinking, he was rather fatalistic about the possibility that one can catch and correct one's own individual biases. This attitude seems to emanate from the “social origins of knowledge” logic built into his paradigm as far as the “inevitable” social rootedness of one's own knowledge is concerned. However, one may argue that several other elements in Mannheim’s epistemological apparatus also contributed to such buffers against individual self-analysis.

In Mannheim’s sociology of knowledge it is the social group that is a legitimate unit of analysis of human knowledge. Very early in his text, Mannheim tried to carve out his niche in the academic debates by distinguishing his “sociological” approach from the previous philosophical and psychological approaches to the problem of knowledge and ideology. Consequently, he decided to avoid the individual level of analysis traditionally taken up in philosophy and psychology by excluding “particular conceptions of ideology” from his sociology of knowledge. Mannheim’s notion of “society” (and thereby “social origins”) was overly interpersonal, not treating the inner subjective reality of the individual’s life itself as a social process—i.e., as a relatively autonomous ensemble of inter/intrapersonal social relations amongst multiple self-identities constructed in the course of the individual’s lifetime. Such an overly interpersonal, and not also intrapersonal, conception of society and of social origins did not allow Mannheim to construct a dialectical notion of the relationship between society and knowledge—not as mutually exclusive and externalized entities, but as entities which stand to one another in terms of the relationship between whole and part. As stated above, the thesis of “social origins of knowledge” would become meaningless and tautological if knowledge is itself conceptualized as a part of the whole that is society and “social existence.”

In *Ideology and Utopia*, Mannheim was rightly critical of the notion of “objectivity” borrowed from natural sciences, and justifiably stressed the role played by the subject in the cognitive and research process. But his notion of the “subject” was consistently and overly collectivized. Individual biases were taken into consideration only if and when they reflected socially conditioned trends in the world-outlooks of like-minded individuals attached to particular social groups. Besides, his notion of the “subject” was also overly intellectualized. He often associated the human subjective cognition with the theoretical activity alone. This led him, on one hand, to believe that the intellectual’s “unconscious” biases may be eradicated merely through theoretical criticism or awareness alone, disregarding their emotional and physical groundings in the being of the total person, and on the other hand to view human practice only in its political, “planning,” form from above, disregarding the potential transformative social force of all human cognitive and practical activity—not just of intellectuals but also that of the “simple man in the street.” It is true that in contrast to Marx, Mannheim positively took account of the need for self-knowledge and self-consciousness of the observer, but this “self” was for him still a theoretically collective self standing over

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1. The definition offered by Robert Merton (217) in his essay for the sociology of knowledge as being “primarily concerned with relations between knowledge and other existential factors in society or culture” (emphasis added) hints at the importance of recognizing knowledge as being itself a part of social existence.
and above individuals full of deep-seated emotional impulses in everyday life, men or women “on the street” whose lives are essentially practical.

Mannheim’s emphasis on social existence as a primary determinant in his sociology of knowledge structurally ties the individual to forces “objectively” beyond her or his control. It reinforced a scholarly field that tended to study only the failing experiences of human life, and not those cases in which human effort, through self-critical and practical activity, succeeds in rising above blind social determinisms to shape the course of intellectual and social development. The new sociologies of knowledge cannot lose sight of the significant role played by individuals in producing new knowledges and new social relations in everyday life, relations which then—it is true—often react back on human intellectual and practical efforts and “determine” their lives so far as individuals remain subconsciously passive and enslaved to their historical and biographical unfolding.

The role played individually by Mannheim’s unconscious biases in the formulation of the theoretical thesis and of the problems historically gripping the sociology of knowledge as a subdiscipline illustrates the degree to which knowledge and society, and self and society, in fact dialectically interact, and reveals the extent to which individual selves can and should be legitimate units of analysis of the sociology of knowledge.

**Towards the Sociology of Self-Knowledge**

The sociology of knowledge was marked in its early history by a tendency to set up grandiose hypothetical schemes. These contributed a number of extremely suggestive leads. Recently its practitioners have tended to withdraw from such ambitious undertakings and to restrict themselves to somewhat more manageable investigations. Although this tendency has been an antidote to earlier types of premature generalizations, it also carries with it the danger of trivialization. Perhaps the sociology of knowledge of the future will return to the more daring concerns of its founders, thus building upon the accumulation of careful and detailed investigation by preceding generations of researchers. (Coser 433)

In order to overcome the shortcomings in Mannheim’s efforts towards establishing the frameworks of a discipline dedicated to the study of the relationship between knowledge and society, we need research strategies which pay particular attention to the following three methodological, theoretical, and historical sets of issues.

Methodologically, the sociology of knowledge cannot in an *a priori* fashion assume that social existence is the ultimate root of human knowledge since social existence is itself also an historical product of human individual and collective praxis. Moreover, it is not very fruitful to assume in an *a priori* fashion that a certain theoretical model of determination universally explains the complex reality of a concrete object of historical investigation. For this reason, in contrast to predeterministic models, it may perhaps be more fruitful to adopt a “postdeterminist” dialectical research strategy which insists that the specific nature of causality between thought and society in concrete histo-biographical investigations can be determined only as a result of concrete analysis, treating in the process various causal modalities hitherto developed by various sociologists of knowledge as equally plausible and worthy of consideration. Needed, in other words, is not a predeterministic sociology
of knowledge but a postdeterminist dialectical sociology of knowledge.

Theoretically, we need a sociology of knowledge which can effectively help us scientifically overcome the social rootedness and biases of our own individual knowledges about the world and about our own selves personally. What we need is a sociology of knowledge that recognizes the ability of not only the intellectuals, but of anyone, to transcend the social rootedness and biases of their knowledge. What is needed is a sociology of knowledge which recognizes that social existence can be as much a product of human knowledges and practices as it is their determinant. The new sociology of knowledge thus conceived must not shy away from incorporating the particular everyday life of the individual into its conceptual framework and must take seriously the interaction of the individual and society, especially focusing on the problem of how one can scientifically study and reconstruct one’s own socially constructed selves. We in fact need to develop theoretical apparatuses which can help the individual scientifically study her or his own selves from a world-historical perspective, approaching the interconnections of the knowledges of the self and of the world in a dialectical fashion.

Ideological and utopian biases in our knowledges do not exist in a non-existent “group mind,” but are articulated in often very specific, personal, and unique ways into our world-views as definite individuals. From this fact, in contrast to Mannheim, we may conclude that human individuals can and should be our legitimate units of analysis (among others). What is important to note is that every individual has the most organic access to her or his own individual biography and knowledge and therefore he or she is most equipped potentially to tackle the deep-rooted biases of her or his own knowledge. Social discourse and external assistance through education and training by others can only help so far as there is direct and self-critical cooperation and willingness by us individually to take up the task of dealing with our personally articulated biases. The ultimate decisive problem in any social scientific attempt at dealing with ideological and utopian biases in knowledge, therefore, has to be tackled at the level of each individual’s selves. Needed, in other words, is not a “sociology of knowledge” in general but a “sociology of self knowledge,” a research strategy which systematically aids us in recognizing and overcoming socially rooted biases in our own personal thoughts, feelings, and actions. This necessitates an approach which helps us to simultaneously pay attention to the dialectical linkage between our knowledge of our individual selves and our knowledge of society at large.

A science which aims to rid human knowledge of socially rooted biases cannot be itself based on biased rejections of other cultural traditions (such as mysticism) which have seriously tackled the study and transformation of the self into the core of their often religiously wrapped doctrines. Mannheim’s academic ambition at building a “sociological” approach in distinction from other disciplines did not allow him to organically incorporate the psychological and humanist points of view into his sociology of knowledge. We need to counter this bias by consciously and critically incorporating studies of self-knowledge across various disciplines and cultural movements.

The historical research strategy of the new sociology of self-knowledge can hopefully go beyond the important study of social origins of human knowledge and practice, to the equally important study of the human origins of knowledge and society. In such intellectual efforts, the sociology of self-knowledge may not need to restrict itself to a particular intellectual or social movement, but can adopt a synthetic strat-
egy of critically assimilating various world-historically produced perspectives pertaining to the problem at hand.

The historical investigations emanating from Mannheim’s sociology of knowledge tended to focus on explaining how various theories and world-views of certain individuals in/and groups were determined by their social positions and interests. Naturally, such an approach is biased against the study of those cases in which definite individuals (and groups) have in fact transcended their social and historical origins and overcome the resulting subconscious biases inherited in their thinking. The new sociology of self-knowledge, therefore, adopts a reverse historical sociological research strategy, and studies the world-history with the hypothetical lense that human individuals can, regardless of their “intellectual” status, in fact rise above their socially rooted interests and biases and consciously determine the course of their own lives. The sociology of self-knowledge especially seeks to explore the dialectical interplay of biographical and world-historical structures in the everyday lives of those individuals, groups, and movements in history who have resisted the status quos while building alternative intra/interpersonal realities in favor of the good life. The sociology of self-knowledge will seek to study those cases from which significant lessons may be drawn as to how the determinateness of social interests and biases can be overcome and experiences of liberation from the blind forces of socio-historical inheritance partially or wholly achieved.

An important scholarly interest resulting from the proposed sociology of self-knowledge will therefore be the study of lives of those individuals, groups, and movements who have been the progenitors of new practices, new social structures, and new knowledges in world history. In such studies, we will focus on the study of definite individuals in these movements, especially exploring the dialectical interplay between their knowledges of their own selves and their knowledges of the social world-systems to which they belonged.1

**CONCLUSION**

In *Ideology and Utopia* Mannheim introduced a new distinction into the previous conceptions of ideology which Berger and Luckmann (9) considered to be Mannheim’s own unique contribution to the theory of ideology. As soon as ideological analysis of adversary’s total ideology becomes a weapon used by all parties against one another, Mannheim argued, a new stage in the development of the concept of ideology is reached where “a matter of difference in degree becom[es] a matter of difference in kind.” The decisive turning point in this process of generalization appears when we begin to analyze not only our opponents’ ideologies, but also that of our own. Here, according to Mannheim, a new distinction between special vs. general ideologies emerges—where “the decisive question is whether the thought of all groups (including our own) or only that of our adversaries is recognized as socially determined.” With the “general formulation of the total conception of ideology, the simple theory of ideology develops into the sociology of knowledge. What was once the intellectual armament of a party is transformed into a method of research in social and intellectual history generally” (Mannheim 77-78).

The greatest merit of Mannheim’s sociology of knowledge was its intended emphasis, through the introduction of the “general conception of ideology,” on turning the gaze of the researcher back onto

1.For further arguments regarding the limits of modern “antisystemic” movements and in favor of critical reconsiderations of alternative approaches as found in the world’s utopian, mystical, and academic traditions see Tamdgidi (2001).
herself or himself—even though this was done using a collective sense of the self. This element of self-reflexivity in Mannheim’s sociology of knowledge, evasive as it was regarding individual self-knowledge, was and still is what distinguishes his approach from the previous and even many subsequent scholarship in the field.

In our reconstructions of what is valuable in Mannheim, however, we need not abide completely by his earlier formulations of the sociology of knowledge. Just because Mannheim’s adversaries have themselves fallen on hard times does not make his arguments valid. Our knowledges do not have to be bound by the social existence of the conceptual structures inherited from Mannheim. They can be transcended.

In *Ideology and Utopia*, Mannheim abandoned the particular conception of ideology, sought after the total conception, and arrived at the general conception of ideology—stressing that not just our adversaries’ viewpoints, but our own as well are ideological. The critique of Mannheim’s argument as presented in this article, however, has revealed the inadequacies of such a general and collectivist conception of ideology apart from the particular and unique circumstances of the individual’s life and thinking. The particular and the general cannot be mechanically separated; they are dialectically interlinked and interpenetrate. They stand to one another as part and whole. They exist through one another. Any attempt by the investigator to search for generally constructed ideological or utopian mental structures over and above the unique reality of her or his own personal conceptions and knowledges would be a self-defeating endeavor.

Mannheim’s sociological imagination needs to be dialectically stretched in two directions. We need to bring into dialectical interaction with one another our personal self-knowledge and our knowledge of the world-historical structures which have for millennia constituted the social existence of our lives. In both of these the assumed singularity of the “individual” self processes and the assumed multiplicities of the world-historical structures need to be questioned and challenged. The dichotomies of knowledge/existence, self/society, and theory/practice must be reconceptualized on a dialectical basis, their relationship being freed from the conceptual and practical bondages of reductive methodological reasoning. Research in the sociology of self-knowledge will aim to contribute to the realization of such a world-historically self-conscious pedagogical and social praxis.

The critique of Mannheim’s argument above has revealed a new conception of ideology which synthesizes the general and the particular conceptions of ideology previously separated in Mannheim’s thinking. We may begin to call this new conception, the concrete conception of ideology. Ultimately, it is the self-critical transcendence of our world-historically constructed ideological and utopian biases at the concrete level of our own unique selves that can begin to liberate us from the invisible shackles of our inner slaveries and help build a truly de-alienated and just global society.

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Figure 1: Unconscious and Conscious Loops
in the Dialectics of Knowledge and Social Existence