

# ***The Challenge of Globalization for the Left:*** **Marxism, Post-Colonialism, or Republican Nationalism**

**Ehud Adiv**

*The Open University, Israel*

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eadive1@bezeqint.net

## **INTRODUCTION**

I view globalization as a kind of neo-liberal attempt to reconstruct and redefine the existing nation-states and their interrelationship in purely economic terms. That is to say, to subordinate independent polities into means or elements within a global economic structure.<sup>1</sup> The main problem with this global neo-liberal structure is the lack of a teleological perspective. Moreover, this one-dimensional, economically motivated state of affairs is presented by neo-liberal writers as the main advantage of the globalist structure as opposed to the political autonomy of different nation-states. As such, they view globalism as the best of all possible worlds.<sup>2</sup>

Truth be told, the opposite applies. Since Aristotle, man has been perceived as a *zoon politicon*, whereas Aristotle defines him as *homo laborans* in natural-biological and/or utilitarian terms. What Aristotle called ‘civic virtue’ is the teleological dimension by means of which man transforms his immediate deterministic existence and achieves *autarchy*:

The life of a mechanic or labourer is incompatible with the practice of virtue ... [because] those who perform menial tasks are either slaves who minister to the wants of an individual or ... public servants.” (*Politics*, Warington’s translation, 1959)

Certainly, Aristotle thinks and speaks in terms of his time. However, the relevant point is his distinction between the autonomous nature of ‘the practice of virtue’ and the instrumental nature of the ‘menial tasks’.

It was Rousseau (1712-78) who first argued against the liberal utilitarian ideas of Locke, Bentham and Mill. Contrary to the latter, he said that only by means of mediated rational interaction of the ‘social contract’ could man realize his human capacity and become what Marx later called a ‘species-being’. As Derathe interprets Rousseau:

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1. David C. Korten puts it quite explicitly: “Governments seem wholly incapable of responding, and public frustration is turning to rage. It is more than a failure of government bureaucracies, however. It is a crisis of governance born of a convergence of ideological, political and technological forces behind a process of economic globalisation that is shifting power away from governments responsible for the public good and toward a handful of corporations and financial institutions driven by a single imperative—the quest for short-term financial gain.” (David C. Korten, 1996, *When Corporations Rule the World*, West Hartford-San Francisco: Kumarian Press & Berret-Koehler Publisher, p. 12.)

2. Thomas Friedman’s *The Lexus and the Olive tree* and Benjamin Barber’s *MacWorld against the Islamic Jihad* are just the most explicit titles of the American globalist perspective vis a vis the particularism of the developed countries.

Human nature can only show its full potential in social life which, in the famous lines from the *Contract* ‘instead of a stupid and unimaginative animal, makes him an intelligent human being’. (Derathe, 1962)

Following Marx and Weber, Horkheimer distinguished between conservative and radical doctrines. A conservative doctrine, Horkheimer explained, is defined in terms of what he called instrumental reasoning—a rationale deriving from means rather than ends. Consequently, conservative writers argue for compliance and conformity with reality as we know it. Radical doctrines are motivated by extra-scientific, i.e. imaginative and/or teleological perspectives, and their task is to criticize the world for the purpose of improving it. Moreover, the former is forced upon the society from above as an holistic form of ‘scientific’ explanation, whereas the latter comes from below as an articulation of society’s ‘general will’. In the words of Horkheimer:

When the idea of reason was conceived, it was intended to achieve more than the mere regulation of the relationship between means and ends. It was regarded as the instrument for understanding those ends, for determining them. ... Philosophy is neither a tool nor a blueprint. (Horkheimer, 1967)

One cannot avoid seeing to what extent the neo-liberal theory of globalization fits into the frame of reference of the conservative theory.

The aim of this paper is to present a critical perspective of the leftist attitude to globalization. In respect of critical theory it is evident that, historically and conceptually, the leftist response to globalization moves between two extremes—the 19<sup>th</sup> century global economic orientation of Marxism on one hand, and the late-20<sup>th</sup> century pluralistic/hybrid tendency of post-colonialism on the other. My criticism is directed against both the Marxist tendency, or as Miliband put it, ‘one form or another of economic reductionism’, and the multi-culturalist attitude of the post-colonial school. In the light of some critical neo-Marxist explorations of nationalism and state, I suggest that republican nation-states and their interactions should be viewed as the main protagonists of the historical process. In the words of Poulantzas: “The only thing that really exists is a social whole at a given moment in its historical existence: e.g. France under Louis Bounaparte or England during the Industrial Revolution” (Poulantzas, 1987).

Thus, it is politics, rather than economics or culture, that actually creates and conditions our historical existence and, subsequently, the collective mode of its resolution.

Benedetto Croce distinguishes between what he calls ‘utilitarian or economic activity’ and ‘moral activity’. The first, he explains, is the will to achieve an objective. The second is the will to achieve a reasonable objective. However, he continues, “one cannot act morally without, at the same time, acting in a utilitarian way.” Following Croce, I suggest that political activity is a synthesis of moral utilitarianism. This dialectical distinction which highlights moral political activity as a rational teleology is, to my mind, the essence of enlightenment, of which Marxism is certainly the most radical expression.

## THE GLOBAL TENDENCY OF MARXISM

The global economic tendency of Marxism seems to be a scientific interpretation of the rationalist-universalist concept of enlightenment. The enlightened writers of the 18<sup>th</sup> century aspired to improve the world, to reconstruct it in the light of a rational universal model. The leaders of the French Revolution viewed their new republic as a starting point, an idealized reconstruction of the world at large. Marx certainly started his investigations from this rational teleological premise. Later on, influenced by the scientific attitudes of his time, he proposed to achieve this vision by means of economic necessity. The difficulty is that Marx viewed the development of the capitalist process itself as a step forward, even as the locomotive of history. A century and a half later, we see that a globalized economy has *not* universalized the world as envisioned in the moral/political ideals of the Enlightenment. Globalization is still essentially what Croce called an ‘economic activity’ characterized by instrumental reasoning rather than by an ‘ethic of responsibility’. Bauman, in his brilliant analysis of globalization, emphasizes this distinction, explaining that globalization is not what we would like to do, but is what is actually happening to us (Bauman, 1998). Marx’s categorical mistake lies in overestimating the deterministic nature of economic globalization and underestimating its teleological-political aspect. Sartre wrote: “as Kant showed, experience provides facts but not necessity, and since we reject all idealist solutions, there is obviously a contradiction here. The dialectical movement is not some powerful force revealing itself behind history like the will of God. The dialectic reveals itself only to an inside observer, that is to say,

to an investigator who lives his investigation both as a possible contribution to the ideology of the whole epoch and as the particular praxis of an individual” (Sartre, 1976).

In light of Sartre’s critique, it seems that Marx viewed history and society as an outsider, a scientist, rather than as an insider and revolutionary. However, as Fleischer pointed out, together with this ‘scientific’ approach, we can also discern in Marx’s early writings at least two other approaches to the concept of history. As a young man, Marx adhered to Feuerbach’s critique of the philosophical assumptions of religion and Hegelianism. In the Paris *Manuscript* of 1844 he emphasized *praxis*—labor—rather than philosophy as the alpha and omega of the historical process. As O’Malley explains: “Philosophy as theory finds the ‘ought’ implicit in the ‘is’, and, as praxis, seeks to make the two coincide” (O’Malley, 1970). Thus Marx saw history as a process of humanization by which Man transformed his specific natural state by means of praxis and became what Marx immediately called a “species-being.”

During 1845-6 another approach gradually developed, a self-criticism, the first negation of the ‘naturalistic’ assumptions of his early writings. In his *German Ideology* Marx rejected all historical determinism or a priori teleology that goes beyond the pursuit of individual aims: “History does nothing, it possesses no tremendous wealth, it fights no battles. It is man, living, breathing man who possesses and struggles. History cannot use man to attain its ends.... for history is simply the activity of man pursuing his ends” (Werke, vol.2, p. 98). Thus Marx expressed, with no trace of ambiguity, a rationalist teleological perspective of the driving force and explication of the historical process.

Two years later, in the *Manifesto*, Marx and Engels returned to their first materialistic approach. Furthermore, in the introduction to his *Critique of Political Economy* (1859), Marx reinforced this approach, writing that: “In the social production of their existence, men inevitably enter into relations which are independent of their will, relations appropriate to a given stage in the development of their material forces of production” (*Critique*, 1976).

It seems that Marx, during his period in London, familiarized himself with the positivist empirical approach of the English liberal economists. Later, in the light of Adam Smith’s concept of ‘the invisible hand’, he too regarded man as *homo laborens* rather than *zoon politicon*. According to Aristotle ‘man is by nature a political animal’, whereas for Marx, as Dobb explains, ‘the human activity that differentiates man from nature and from most other animals is productive labour’ (Dobb, 1976).

Nevertheless, Marx, as a Hegelian, certainly looked for the social entity beyond the capitalist mode of production. “This (German) tradition attempts to interpret the individual person, institution, act, or modus operandi by seeing it as a manifestation or expression of a larger morphological unit that accentuates specific data” (Gerth & Wright Mills, 1974).

Thus Marx, unlike the British economists, viewed capitalism merely as the existing mode of production rather than as ‘real’ human society, i.e. communism. As Engels wrote—where the English economists had finished was where Marx was just beginning. The question is how, according to Marx, the working man (*homo laborans*) could transform himself into a political entity. Hobsbawm argues, in response, that: “if we wish to answer the great questions of all history—namely, how, why, and through what processes humanity evolved from cave-men to cosmic travellers, wielders of nuclear forces and genetic engineers—we can only do it by asking Marx’s type of questions, even if we do not accept all his answers” (Hobsbawm, 1984). He seems to forget that the English economists had already asked these questions.

The important questions are those first raised by Rousseau: if, how and through what processes do scientific and economic progress determine the progress and liberation of society as a whole? In other words, how can we transform the instrumental reasons of civilization by what Kant called ‘rational citizens of the world’ according to some agreed-upon plan?” (“Toward Perpetual Peace”). In response, Rousseau argues against Locke and Smith, who viewed economic and technological progress as an extension and perfection of the ‘natural state’. Rousseau describes first civilizations in negative terms, as destabilizing basic equality and, subsequently, the liberty of natural man. He emphasized the contrast between natural and civilized man, which was later ‘solved’ through the *Social Contract*, i.e. by a rational political act in which man overcomes and overturns the current iniquitous and oppressive contract to regain the original equality and liberty of the natural state.

As a critical modernist, Marx approved Rousseau’s diagnosis concerning the oppression of civilization, and shared his criticisms of civil society. However, contrary to Rousseau, he, as an economist, viewed the development of civilization as a gradual linear process of transformation. Later, he viewed the means of production and productive labour as the starting point, the driving force, or, to use his term, the ‘basis’ of the historical process. Moreover, Marx believed in the inevitability of historical movement, and predicted the self-destruction of capitalism and the establishment of a communist society—defining the worker as the ‘real’ citizen, the communist. As Aron argued: “The essence of Marx’s

scientific effort has been to demonstrate scientifically what was for him the inevitable evolution of the capitalist system. Then it is immediately apparent why it is impossible to separate the analyst of capitalism from the prophet of socialism” (Aron, 1968).

*Das Kapital* is, indeed, both an analysis of capitalist mode of production and a prediction of its self-destruction. Therein England, as a social entity, is presented as the ideal or, to paraphrase Lenin, as a higher stage of capitalism.

As Horkheimer and Adorno demonstrated in the ‘Dialectic of Enlightenment,’ in regard to the 20<sup>th</sup> century it is quite unclear why, how, and in what direction history is moving. They argue, in typically Rousseau-esque style, that civilization so far has been inadequate in regard to development and emancipation of society as a whole. However, as a revolutionary, Marx’s texts deal more with the political struggles of the time than with the laws of historical materialism.

In regard to the Irish question, Marx admitted that more thorough investigation had led him to conclude that the real unity of the proletariat is not merely a matter of class interest. He realized that, even at the centre of the highly developed British capitalist system, the workers’ struggles for emancipation were confused. In spite of their common interests, their different ethnic, religious and national ideas divided the Irish workers from the English. He understood the relevance and importance of the Irish workers’ national consciousness in contrast to the dominant nationalism of the English workers.

However, Marx and Engels did not essentially change their original global view of nationalism. As Rosdolsky indicated, to the Czechs and the southern Slavs nationalism was basically a sort of atavistic reaction to the triumphant march of German civilization. Rosdolsky argues that the editorial of the *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* enthusiastically supported the decision of the Viennese Reichstag on September 11th 1848 not to permit the use of languages other than German. The editorial commented: “The deputies, therefore, must speak, interpolate, etc., in their own tongue. The Reichstag will become a translating institution, a Babel-mixture of tongues, which will result in the Reichstag’s downfall” (Rosdolsky, 1986). The editorial certainly viewed ‘the others’ and their languages in German globalist terms. Moreover, it was the radical German deputies who were the most ardent advocates of the Reichstag’s decision. Rosdolsky quotes the radical Ludwig Lohner’s telling words: ‘Let us not forget the one language we should all speak, the *language of freedom*, which we need so much’ (for Lohner, of course, this was German). Rosdolsky continues “Once again it is Gregoire’s ‘*langue de la liberte*’ that we meet—not only in the French revolution of 1789, but also in the German revolution of 1848 and even in the Russian revolution of 1917.” Indeed, in the enlightened terms of the French, German, and Russian revolutions, ‘freedom’ was defined and conceived as society’s rationalization of nature. In the explicit words of Kant: “The highest purpose of nature, which is the development of all the capacities that can be achieved by mankind, is attainable only by society” (Sherover).

The leaders of French Revolution, adherents of Rousseau and Kant, thus believed that they could and should compel people to be free, and that it was their emancipatory mission to universalise the republican revolution. Marx and Lenin, unlike Robespierre, certainly understood that freedom could not be forced upon people from above through the ‘language of freedom’, that it could only be achieved by the people themselves. Yet they too, like Robespierre, viewed freedom as inevitable, an objective process that develops independently of men’s will.

At the turn of the 20th century, Kautsky, Lenin, Trotsky and Rosa Luxemburg—the theoreticians of the Second International—still spoke in basically the same Marxist economic terms. Lenin’s *The Development of Capitalism in Russia and Imperialism: the higher stage of capitalism* is only the most explicit example of this Marxist orientation of the Second International.

In the second half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, the analyses of Mandel, Sweezy, Wallerstein and Amin come to mind. The common denominator of all these Marxist interpretations is their globalist economic orientation and their attempt to underline the global nature of western capitalism as the driving force of the historical movement.

Georg Lukacs, Ernst Bloch and their disciples of the Frankfurt School were the first to criticize the scientific and functionalist tendencies of Marxist Leninism. Lukacs made a clear distinction between class interest and class consciousness, between *Sein* and *Sollen*. As their students, Lukacs and Bloch could not ignore the argument of Weber and Zimmel that any kind of social action must be mediated by individual intentionality and/or a teleological perspective. Certainly, they were fully aware of the relevance and importance of the subjective perspective as far as Marxism was concerned. In light of Weber’s criticism of Marx’s economic materialism as a single-factor theorem, they argued for the relevancy and importance of what Bloch called *Endzeit* (final end) or *Ultimum*, i.e., history as a unification of present and future, subjective and objective. They also agreed with Weber’s criticism of the instrumentalist nature of ‘the spirit of capitalism’ as an ‘iron cage of commodities and regulations’. However, as Hegelians, they saw Weber’s

definition of capitalism only 'per se'. Thus, Lukacs, Bloch, Horkheimer and Adorno, well before Giddens, criticized the functionalist interpretation of Marxism, and argued that revolutionary action must be understood as an evolving teleology that cannot be explained in purely materialistic terms of class interest.

## THE ANTI-GLOBALIZATION TREND OF POST-COLONIALISM

The post-colonial school of the late 20<sup>th</sup> Century, with Edward Said as one of its most important thinkers, seemed to be the antithesis of the previously accepted global economic tendency of Marxism. This is evident in its attempt to challenge the hegemony of the Occident by positing the genuine cultural identity of the Orient. Contrary to Marxism, post-colonialism articulates a plurality of centres, a multiplicity of emergent identities. Marx argued for the deconstruction of the dominant capitalist structure by means of the internal class struggle, whereas the post-colonial writers are not so much engaged in describing empire as in re-defining its hybridized offspring.

Furthermore, Marx viewed what he called the material basis as the starting point and major motivator of the historical process. Conversely, post-colonial writers are concerned with the power that resides in discourse and textuality. Resistance, then, appropriately arises in and from textuality. To paraphrase an American slogan—according to Said, Spivak and Homi K. Bhabha—there is no liberation without representation. Hence, against the diachronic monistic concept of Marxism, Homi K. Bhabha, proposes a synchronic pluralistic concept of the world, reviving the Biblical image of the Tower of Babel, within which the different identities represent themselves in terms of their own discourse, either independently or in opposition to the binary rationalist discourse of modernity. Homi K. Bhabha, writes:

As a mode of analysis, the post-colonial perspective attempts to revise those rationalities that set up the relationship of the third world and the first world in a binary structure of opposition. The post-colonial perspective resisted attempts at holistic forms of social explanation, demanding recognition of the complex cultural and political boundaries that exist on the fringe of these often opposed political spheres. The language of cultural community should be rethought, as has been the profound shift in the language of sexuality. (Homi K. Bhabha, 1998)

These new cultural boundaries between opposing political spheres derive in and from what Homi K. Bhabha, called the 'Third Space', a hybrid identity which was represented and ultimately reconstructed by means of a multiplicity of voices and textualisms. In one of her major works, Gayatri Chakravarty Spivak asks "Can the subaltern speak?" Spivak begins her emancipatory drive from a particular expression rather than from the essence of universal discourse. Similarly, in his *Orientalism* Said criticizes Marx for disregarding the "subalterns'" ability to represent themselves. Furthermore, in his theory of Orientalism, globalization is basically a European invention, a post-modern version of the stereotypical one-dimensional attitude which, during the colonialist period, aimed to universalize the supremacy of Eurocentricity. In his own words, "Without examining Orientalism as discourse one can not possibly understand the enormously systematic discipline by which the European culture was able to manage—and even to produce—the Orient" (Said, 1978).

What matters for Said is the "Orientalist discourse," what Foucault called a governing statement. Globalization, he said, is merely how the American and European cultural apparatus has been covering Islam. Accordingly, it is only the Orientalist discourse that produced the Orient, the ultimate "other" of the Occident, passive and devoid of historicity. It seems that Said viewed globalization as arbitrary, wrong and immoral, as glorifying western rationalism and modernity by ignoring their dark and oppressive aspects.

My critique of post-colonialism is thus a synthesis of three critical perspectives: 1) political; 2) diachronic; and 3) republican.

### *The political perspective*

Post-colonial writers see the cultural discourse as an explanation and a driving force of the historical process, focusing on the textual rather than the political contextual. Consequently, they underestimate and disregard politics which, since Plato and Aristotle, has always been about power and the *parhesis* of moral virtue. As Held put it "Politics creates and conditions all aspects of our lives," so that culture is also conditioned by politics. Conversely, in Orientalism, the opposite applies. It was the Orientalist discourse that conditioned colonialist politics—"Orientalism is a style

of thought based upon an ontological and epistemological distinction between ‘the Orient’ and ‘the Occident’” (Said, 1978).

The problem, according to Said, derives from the European mind-set rather than the reality of European colonialism. Instead of a critical analysis of what C. Wright Mills called the “power elite,” i.e., the political protagonists of the Occident, he prefers the literary critique of “anyone who teaches, writes about, or researches the Orient ... including Aeschylus, Victor Hugo, Dante and Karl Marx...” For this reason, everything in *Orientalism* is inverted. Radical writers since Rousseau and Marx emphasize the political context, the instrumental and utilitarian nature of European discourse and textuality. With Said, the opposite applies, it was the Orientalist style of thought that determined European imperialism.

Said also criticises the Orientalist tendency of European literature that claims the cultural authenticity of the Orient. However, he seems to forget that the oriental patriarchs also had their own discourse, concepts presented in the name of objectivity, including God, legendary figures and the primordial past. Obviously this was their way of legitimising their rule in the eyes of their victims. To use Gellner’s familial metaphor—in the Orient there was also a marriage of politics and culture, since Oriental culture has always been used there to dominate and segregate, even though the strategy was quite different from that employed in the Occident. The Untouchables of India are just one shocking example of this kind of “Oriental marriage.” So it is not really clear in whose name Said and Spivak are speaking when they criticize the “Occidental marriage.” It is surely not in the name of those culturally identified as Untouchables? Indeed, it is quite clear that the Untouchables cannot represent themselves unless and until they liberate themselves, which is already a political perspective.

The problem with Said and Spivak is that they, unlike Fanon, failed to emphasize the emancipatory political context of their critique. Nonetheless, Orientalism is still a critical theory and, to paraphrase Gramsci, anything that is critical is nothing other than politics. The post-colonial critique, like war, is a variant of politics.

The paradox of Orientalism is that it plays, to a large extent, into the hands of those Orientalists against whom it argued. We can say about Said and Spivak, as Balak said to Balaam “I took thee to curse mine enemies, and, behold, thou hast blessed them altogether” (Numbers 23: 11).

Said quite convincingly interprets the essentialism of Bernard Lewis and Huntington concerning the Orient, though his interpretation also deals mainly with the one-dimensional superficiality of discourse and representation. Inevitably, at the end of the day, he only reiterates or reflects their dichotomy, even if in the genuine frame of reference of the Orient. Together with the dominant Orientalist discourse, he presents the multiple voices of the Orient. As Colletti put it, he is just “one of them.” Held argues that only politics can mediate or transform the Orientalist dichotomy between the two—“Politics exist in all groups and societies, cutting across public and private life ... a universal dimension of human life unrelated to any specific ‘site’ or set of institutions” (Held, 1996).

Said and Spivak have indeed demonstrated that the subaltern can speak. The difficulty is that they call on him to speak only in his own oriental tongue, independently and in opposition to the universal language of politics. Whereas Orientalism, like *The Clash of Civilizations* is about a “kulturkampf” rather than about the “universal dimension of human life.”

### *The diachronic perspective*

The diachronic perspective exposes the synchronicity of post-colonialism, its a-historical explanation of globalization as a binary interrelationship between West and East that could be reversed or broken by the multiple voices of the subalterns themselves. If domination and subjection occur in and because of representation, then, as Spivak put it, the only question is “can the subaltern speak?” Fortunately (or unfortunately) beyond text and representation there is always the historical process.

It seems that Said failed to distinguish between the phenomenon of globalization and what Hegel called its “totality.” In Orientalist terms, globalization is *not* the totality of the historical process but a manifestation of Orientalist thinking as the essence of the Occident. However, as Hegel said: “A real definition cannot be given as an isolated proposition, but must elaborate the real history of an object, for only its history can explain its reality” (Science of Logic, 1967).

Indeed, European domination was a long historical process, not “merely a cunning trick of dominators” (Gellner). In fact, as Horkheimer and Adorno explained in *The Dialectic of Enlightenment*, European rulers imposed their domination on their victims as a universal truth while simultaneously arguing for the genuine universal ideals of the En-

lightenment. They criticized what they called “instrumental reasoning” as being heteronomous to enlightenment itself.

Gellner, in one of his polemic articles on post-modernism, made a similar distinction, though he acknowledges that Kipling’s works did serve the colonialist rulers. He adds that Said’s repudiation of Kipling “also necessitates repudiating Descartes. In fact, Descartes determined pursuit of an objective truth untainted by cultural blinkers had forged the tools and weapons necessary for a colonial-patriarchal world domination” (Gellner,1997). Obviously, in regard to Kipling, this was only an interpretation of scientific objectivity, independent of Descartes’ intentions.

The bottom line of my premise lies in the attitude of the post-colonial writers to the whole concept of modern universality. I distinguish between critical theories such as those of Frankfurt School that defend the enlightened emancipatory essence of globalization, and postmodernist theories such as post-colonialism that totally reject globalization as an orientalist discourse. To use Gellner’s metaphor, it is one thing to criticize Kipling in the name of universal liberty, equality, and fraternity, and quite another thing to criticize Descartes precisely because of his determined pursuit of a universal truth.

### *The Republican Perspective*

I view republicanism as a realization of what Aristotle called “civic virtue” by means of political institutions, mainly, the nation-state. As Gramsci put it: “In reality, the state must be conceived of as an educator, inasmuch as it tends precisely to create a new type or level of civilization” (Gramsci,1991).

Indeed, the republican nation-state, or to use Habermas’s term the “social state,” as an educator has created a new type or level of civilization. Conversely, post-colonialism represents the old civilizations precisely because does represent rather than educate. Thus, in *Covering Islam*, Said presented a particular virtue of Islam vs. the dominant discourse of the American cultural apparatus. He wrote: “The new states of the third world are imitations, known only through what they are imitating, not by virtue of what they are” (Said,1997). Obviously, what matters to Said are ‘the new states of the third world.’

However, in terms of the republican perspective, the main difficulty with Said’s approach lies in its libertarian orientation. I suggest that, in spite of Said’s radical tone, his representation of the new states of the third worlds by virtue of what they are is analogous to the libertarian argument in favor of civil society, i.e. a simplistic dichotomy between the arbitrariness of the state apparatus from above and the state of nature of civil society from below. Said may have said that Islamic virtue is still an invention rather than a given, but this is obviously an enlightened interpretation of Islam. In fact, Islamic virtue is indeed envisaged as a divine entity similar to the “state of nature.” Furthermore, in the eyes of Hasan al Bana, Said Kutub, and their followers “in the new states of the third world it is precisely the divine essence of Islam that elevates it above the new civilizations of the West.”

Aristotle said “He who is stateless by nature and not by chance, is either subhuman or superhuman.” Said, after Foucault, seems to contradict or disregard the whole tradition of enlightened radical theory since Rousseau, even theories that have totally negated the dichotomy between the civil state and the state of nature.

“While to Locke and Kant and to the entire liberal-natural law tradition in general, the contract ‘is not an innovation in the natural-legal order, but only consolidates it, realizes it in a more perfect and rational form’, to Rousseau the contract meant the renunciation of the state and freedom of nature, and the creation of a new moral and social order” (Colletti, 1976).

Said and Spivak certainly present the new states of the third world and the Orient vis-à-vis the dominant cultural apparatus of the Occident. But they fail to see that we (rather than “they”) are already living in a global world, and that we simply cannot speak in terms of what we were. Instead, they insist that they (rather than “we”) can stop the clock, or even, as Fanon argued, turn it back in order to be and be seen by virtue of what we were. Historically, it was the western republican nation-states that initially managed to control the economic capitalist system and to set it in harmony with their moral political perspective.

### *The two ideal types of nationalism*

In Gellner’s and Hobsbawm’s terms, nationalism is a modern political principle which corresponds to industrial-bourgeois society, i.e., the modern nation-state. Hobsbawm states explicitly that “Like most serious students, I do not regard the ‘nation’ as a primary or unchanging social entity. It belongs exclusively to a particular historical period. It is a social entity only insofar as it relates to a certain kind of modern territorial state—the nation-state, and it is pointless to discuss nation and nationality except insofar as both relate to it” (Hobsbawm, 1989).

In other words, nationalism belongs to the age of republicanism, to government by the people and for the people, which was first introduced by the French Revolution. However, Gellner and Hobsbawm also argue against what Eriksen calls 'ethnic ideologies', which define nationalism in terms of a given ethnic or cultural identity—"In terms of genetics, this is an arbitrary distinction; in terms of culture, it is probably even more so; and the example is an interesting indication of how biology and race are cultural constructions" (Eriksen, 1993).

Eriksen makes a clear distinction between nationalism as a social entity, or Croce's objective of moral activity, and as an ahistorical and apolitical entity determined in purely ethnic, cultural, and/or ideological terms. Thus, to paraphrase Gellner, in France it was not the French nation that made France and French nationalism, but the other way round. Consequently, as Brubaker puts it, French political nationhood was understood as state-centered and assimilationist, and hence emancipatory (Brubaker, 1992).

The second type is what Hans Kohn calls 'organic nationalism' which arose first in Germany as a reaction to the dual challenge of the Industrial Revolution in Britain and the democratic emancipatory teleology of the French Revolution. In contrast to French political nationalism, the driving force of German nationalism at the beginning of the 19<sup>th</sup> century was the romantic ideology that highlighted the mythological past and the 'authentic' ethnic identity of the German *Volk*. As Croce put it: "The romanticism of the second generation was a shameful pathological phenomenon which was condemned by Goethe and Hegel."

Yet, in reactionary Germany of that time, ideological nationalism was a substitute and compensation for the absence of a real popular republican movement. Karl August von Hardenberg, a reformer at the court of Prussia's Frederick Wilhelm III, said "What France did from below, we should do from above" (Thompson, 1972).

Historically, the German nation-state was ultimately implemented from above, with the help of the Prussian army. Moreover, in the 1920s, following Germany's defeat in the First World War, its *Volk*-centred nationhood gradually transformed itself into Nazism, a populist ideology invented and set in motion deliberately to prevent the emergence of any truly popular republican movement from below. Hobsbawm concludes that "Exclusive identity politics do not come naturally to people. They are more likely to be forced upon them from outside" (Hobsbawm, 1996). In the case of the German people, the *Volk*-centred nationhood imposed upon them was reactionary from the very beginning.

## CONCLUSION

In my view, republican nationalism is the only viable body politic that can control and contain the invisible hand of globalization. As Habermas insisted, historically and conceptually it was only the social states in the second half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century that succeeded in controlling the global capitalist system, putting it, to some extent, in harmony with their own political purposes.

Barber's article *Jihad vs. MacWorld* quotes Ortega y Gasset's argument of more than 60 years ago, that "nationalism is nothing but a mania." He concludes that—"In the 1920s, and again today, it (nationalism) is more often a reactionary and divisive force, polarising the very nations it once helped to cement together" (Barber, 2001).

In the 1930s, fascist nationalism in Spain was indeed nothing but a mania. However, Barber forgets that Spanish republican nationalism, as well as French, Italian and Russian patriotism, were all historical motivators that finally defeated Fascism.

Conversely, post-colonialism seems, both conceptually and historically, to be a post-modern version of nationalism. Historically, its cultural premise, similar to the German nationalist ideology at the turn of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, is basically a substitute, in the absence of a real republican uprising in the new states of the third world. A reliable indication of this is how *Orientalism* (rather than "The Orient") has been adopted by the fundamentalist Islamic movements in the Middle East. Conceptually, Said's attempt to revive the new states of the third world by virtue of what they are seems to be yet another neo-romantic chimera, similar to Fichte and Friedrich's revival of the German *Volk*. At the end of the day, post-colonialism seems to be a rather conservative theory, precisely because of its apolitical regressive perspective.

This approach seems to also comprise the conservative essence of Barber's *Jihad and MacWorld* and Friedman's *The Lexus and the Olive Tree*. Barber and Friedman obviously present the new states of the third world by describing the Middle East either in radical Islamic terms, or by using the traditional metaphor of the olive tree. In terms of Barber and Friedman's binary paradigm, Said obviously represents the Jihad (holy war) and the olive tree, whereas they represent MacWorld and the Lexus. Both parties, whether consciously or unconsciously, ignore Middle Eastern republi-



can nationalism as the simultaneous embodiment of two extremes—economic globalization and the particularism of Islam.

A relevant case study for post-colonial theoreticians might be the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Politically, it has been mainly about power and domination over the people and the land of Palestine, and hence could certainly be viewed as a conflict between the domination of the state of Israel vs. Palestinian nationalism. However, in terms of what Said called the orientalist style of thought, this political conflict is viewed largely as an epistemological conflict between Occident and Orient, a conflict occurring essentially in the domain of discourse and textuality. Furthermore, in the synchronicity of Barber's and Friedman's dichotomy, the *Hamas* and *Islamic Jihad* movements indeed play a particularistic and divisive role as compared to the globalism of MacDonald's and Toyota. Nonetheless, one can see that nationalism is the Palestinians' prime motivation towards unity and progress—the unifying and progressive force against both the ethnic particularism of *Islamic Jihad* and the globalist hegemony of what Said called the 'Occident', of the Israeli occupation.

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